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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 The State charged thirty-five-year-old Lucas Francke with possession of a 
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.  Mr. Francke filed a motion 
to suppress the drug and drug paraphernalia evidence, on the basis the statute used to 
justify reasonable suspicion for Mr. Francke’s traffic stop was unconstitutionally vague 
as applied.  The district court denied the motion to suppress.  Mr. Francke then agreed 
to plead guilty to the charges under a conditional plea agreement reserving the right to 
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.  The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  On appeal, 
Mr. Francke asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 At Mr. Francke’s motion to suppress hearing, the parties stipulated to the 
following facts.  (See Tr., p.6, L.9 – p.9, L.9.)  Ada County Sheriff’s Office 
Deputy Pickard had been on patrol, following a white pickup truck with a trailer ball hitch 
through the bumper that blocked part of the license plate.  (Tr., p.7, Ls.21-24; see 
R., p.93.)  Deputy Pickard initially had been unable to get an angle from which to read 
the license plate because the road had traffic going each way, and he could not read 
the entire license plate from directly behind the truck.  (See Tr., p.8, Ls.7-15, p.8, L.25 – 
p.9, L.2.)  Once Deputy Pickard stopped the truck and left his vehicle, he was able to 
ascertain the two letters “XR” on the license plate were blocked.  (See Tr., p.7, L.24 – 
p.8, L.3.)  The truck was an older model with the license plate in a standard position, 
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and the license plate was securely fastened.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.16-21.)  Mr. Francke was the 
passenger in the truck.  (See Tr., p.8, Ls.12-13.)   
 Beyond the stipulated facts, the presentence report stated Deputy Pickard 
detected the odor of marijuana coming from the cab of the truck during his conversation 
with the truck’s occupants.  (See Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)  Deputy 
Kindelberger responded to the scene with a K-9 unit.  (PSI, p.3.)  Before the K-9 was 
deployed, the driver of the truck admitted to having a small amount of marijuana in the 
truck.  (PSI, p.3.)  The deputies searched Mr. Francke, and found a total of 7.6 grams of 
methamphetamine, two pipes, a digital scale, a mirror, razor blades, and $140.00, all in 
a backpack near his person.  (PSI, p.3.)  Mr. Francke reportedly admitted to being in 
possession of the backpack.  (See PSI, p.3.)  The deputies arrested Mr. Francke and 
took him to the Ada County Jail.  (See PSI, p.3.) 
 The State charged Mr. Francke by Information with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance, felony, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c), and one count of possession of 
drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, I.C. § 37-2734A.  (R., pp.57-58.)  Mr. Francke 
entered a not guilty plea.  (R., p.76.) 
 Mr. Francke filed a Motion to Suppress, requesting “an Order suppressing the 
drugs and drug paraphernalia that was seized following the unlawful stop of Defendant’s 
vehicle . . . obtained by law enforcement in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution.”  
(R., pp.90-92.)  Mr. Francke also filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to 
Suppress.  (R., pp.93-99.)  In the memorandum, he asserted the State would rely upon 
I.C. § 49-428(2) to argue the truck was in violation of Idaho law, which gave 
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Deputy Pickard reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.  (See R., p.95.)  
I.C. § 49-428(2) provides:  
Every license plate shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle to 
which it is assigned to prevent the plate from swinging, be at a height not 
less than twelve (12) inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom 
of the plate, be in a place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be 
maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly 
legible, and all registration stickers shall be securely attached to the 
license plates and shall be displayed as provided in section 49-443(4), 
Idaho Code. 
 
 Mr. Francke asserted “[t]he language ‘clearly visible’ and ‘maintained free from foreign 
materials’ in I.C. § 49-428(2) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant and 
allowed [Deputy] Pickard to arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforce the requirement of 
the statute against Defendant.”  (R., p.95.) 
 Mr. Francke characterized the issue as “whether the language ‘clearly visible’ 
and ‘maintained free from foreign materials in in a condition to be clearly legible’” from 
Section 49-428(2) “applies only to the license plate itself or also to other attachments to 
the vehicle that are in front of the plate.”  (R., p.95.)  He asserted that language was 
“unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would not know 
whether that applies to objects attached to the vehicle in front of the license plate, or if it 
applies only to the plate itself.”  (R., p.95.)  Mr. Francke asserted “[t]he statute does not 
define with sufficient clarity what is prohibited.  For example, it does not state that the 
plate must be in a place and position to be clearly visible to vehicles travelling directly 
behind it.”  (R., p.95 (emphasis in original).) 
 Mr. Francke further asserted “[t]he stop of the truck was unreasonable based 
upon the unconstitutionality of I.C. § 49-428(2), and there was no other reason 
articulated by Officer Pickard to justify the stop of the truck that Defendant was travelling 
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in.”  (R., p.96.)  Thus, Mr. Francke asserted “all evidence obtained following the unlawful 
investigative stop must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.”  (R., p.96.) 
 The State filed a State’s Objection and Response to the Defendant’s Motion to 
Suppress.  (R., pp.103-115.)  The State argued “Deputy Pickard had reasonable and 
articulable suspicion to believe that the vehicle the defendant was traveling in was in 
violation of Idaho Code 49-428(2).”  (R., p.105.)  Based on State v. Kinch, 159 Idaho 96, 
100-01, 356 P.3d 389, 393-94 (Ct. App. 2015), where the Idaho Court of Appeals 
clarified “that ‘clearly legible’ includes the ability to easily read the temporary permit from 
another vehicle,” the State contended “the language ‘at all times’ and ‘clearly legible’ 
make it clear that the legislature intended the statute to require the license plate to be 
easily readable from a vehicle behind the defendant’s vehicle.”  (R., pp.105-06.)  The 
State argued, “[i]n this case, the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger had a 
foreign material, a trailer ball, covering a portion of the license plate preventing the 
license plate from being easily readable.”  (R., p.106.) 
 At the motion to suppress hearing, Mr. Francke repeated the assertion that 
I.C. § 49-428 “is unconstitutionally vague.”  (Tr., p.11, Ls.6-8.)  Mr. Francke also asked 
the district court to “find that the plain reading of this statute applies only to objects that 
are directly on the plate and that—that the language ‘free from foreign materials’ applies 
only to materials that are actually on the plate and not away from the plate such as the 
trailer ball hitch.”  (Tr., p.11, Ls.16-24.)  Mr. Francke clarified the void for vagueness 
challenge was as applied, not facial.  (Tr., p.16, Ls.10-20.)  The State submitted the 
issue on the briefing.  (Tr., p.19, Ls.5-6.)   
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 The district court then stated, “I think the statute is clear; to parse it more closely 
is to ignore the admonition from our appellate courts that we are to read things in their 
plain language.”  (Tr., p.21, Ls.8-11.)  The district court thought “clearly visible” had a 
common meaning that could be understood, and the rationale for license plates was so 
law enforcement and others could identify a vehicle when it was on the highway or on 
the road.  (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-18.)  The district court did not think “that we can say that this 
is an unconstitutionally vague statute.”  (Tr., p.22, Ls.6-7.)  According to the district 
court, the language about keeping the license plate free from foreign materials was not 
involved here; the district court would not consider “the trailer ball hitch to be foreign 
material.”  (See Tr., p.22, Ls.7-21.)  Instead, the district court thought “the real issue 
here is the obstruction of the plate by the ball itself.”  (Tr., p.22, Ls.21-23.) 
 From a practical standpoint, the district court suggested one could either move 
the license plate because the statute did not require the license plate to be in a 
particular place, or remove the trailer hitch ball.  (See Tr., p.22, L.24 – p.23, L.12.)  The 
district court stated, “[t]here is no record here . . . that the ball itself is welded. . . .  
[T]railer hitch balls are removable.”  (Tr., p.23, Ls.12-15.)  The district court denied the 
motion to suppress.  (Tr., p.24, Ls.13-14.) 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Francke later agreed to plead guilty to the 
charges.  (Tr., p.30, L.7 – p.31, L.13.)  The parties agreed to open recommendations at 
sentencing.  (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-3.)  Mr. Francke reserved his right to appeal the district 
court’s denial of his motion to suppress.  (Tr., p.30, Ls.7-23, p.34, Ls.21-25; R., p.128.)  
The district court accepted Mr. Francke’s guilty plea.  (Tr., p.44, Ls.5-9.) 
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 At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a 
unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, and retain jurisdiction.  
(Tr., p.56, Ls.5-10.)  Mr. Francke’s defense counsel informed the district court 
Mr. Francke was going to be sentenced on two felonies in Canyon County the week 
after the sentencing hearing in this case.  (Tr., p.57, L.18 – p.58, L8.)  Mr. Francke 
recommended the district court place him on probation.  (Tr., p.57, Ls.18-20, p.59, Ls.4-
7, p.63, L.19.)   For the possession of a controlled substance count, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  
(R., pp.156-60.)  The district court deferred pronouncing sentence on the possession of 
drug paraphernalia count “until the rider review hearing.”  (See R., p.158.) 
 Mr. Francke filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of 
Conviction and Order Retaining Jurisdiction and Commitment.  (R., pp.146-49; see 
R., pp.163-67 (Amended Notice of Appeal).) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Francke’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Francke’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Mr. Francke asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion 
to suppress, because I.C. § 49-428(2) is void for vagueness.  Because Section 49-
428(2), the statute used to justify reasonable suspicion for Mr. Francke’s traffic stop, is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Francke’s conduct, there was no reasonable 
and articulable suspicion that the truck he occupied was being driven contrary to traffic 
laws.  The traffic stop therefore violated Mr. Francke’s constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  The district court should have suppressed the 
drug and drug paraphernalia evidence found as a result of the traffic stop. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The standard of review of a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress is two-
fold.  The appellate court will not overturn the trial court’s factual findings unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  However, the application of constitutional standards to the facts 
found by the district court is given free review.”  State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 
81 (2000). 
 Similarly, the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de 
novo.  State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197 (1998).  A party challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute must overcome a strong presumption of validity.  Id. 
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C. Idaho Code § 49-428(2) Is Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied To 
Mr. Francke’s Conduct 
 
 Mr. Francke asserts I.C. § 49-428(2) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
his conduct.  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. 
Const. amend. IV.; Idaho Const. art. I, § 17.  Evidence obtained in violation of this 
constitutional right is generally inadmissible against the accused as the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree.”  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963); 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
A traffic stop by law enforcement constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650 & n.1, 653 (1979).  A traffic stop 
is akin to a limited investigative detention and analyzed under the principles set forth in 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  See Rodriguez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. 
Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015).  Determining whether an investigative detention is reasonable 
involves a dual inquiry into whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and 
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place.  State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 614 (Ct. 
App. 2014).   
An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable 
facts which justify reasonable suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is 
about to be engaged in criminal activity.  Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 26; State v. 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003)).  Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer 
may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is reasonable and 
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articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.  See United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.   
Here, Mr. Francke asserts there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
the truck he occupied was being driven contrary to traffic laws, because I.C. § 49-
428(2), the statute used to justify reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop (see, e.g., 
R., p.105), is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct.   
The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001).  This 
“doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”  Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citation omitted).  “The more important aspect of the 
vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine – 
the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement.’”  Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).   
“Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute 
may permit a ‘standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to 
pursue their personal predilections.’”  Id.  (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 575).  
“Legislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the 
criminal law.”  Smith, 415 U.S. at 575.  Rather, the “absence of any ascertainable 
standard for inclusion or exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process Clause.”  
Id. at 578 (citation omitted).  Simply put, a law is void for vagueness when it subjects a 
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person “to criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that police, court, and jury [are] 
free to react to nothing more than their own preferences . . . .”  Id.   
 A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied 
to a defendant’s conduct.  State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003), abrogated on 
other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1069 (2013).  To succeed 
in making an as applied challenge, a defendant “must show that he did not receive fair 
notice from the statute and interpretive case law that his particular conduct was 
punishable.”  State v. Wees, 138 Idaho 119, 123 (2002) (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 
733, 755-57 (1974)). 
 In this case, Mr. Francke challenged I.C. § 49-428(2) as unconstitutionally vague 
as applied.  (See Tr., p.16, Ls.10-20.)  Section 49-428(2) provides, in relevant part, that 
every license plate shall “at all times . . . be in a place and position to be clearly visible, 
and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly 
legible . . . .”  I.C. § 49-428(2).   
 Mindful of the plain language of Section 49-428(2) and its mandate that every 
license plate shall at all times be “clearly visible,” see Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l 
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889 (2011), Mr. Francke asserts the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to his conduct.  As Mr. Francke asserted during the suppression 
hearing, “the plain reading of this statute applies only to objects that are directly on the 
plate and that—that the language ‘free from foreign materials’ applies only to materials 
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that are actually on the plate and not away from the plate such as the trailer ball hitch.”  
(See Tr., p.11, Ls.16-24.)1   
Thus, because Section 49-428(2), the statute used to justify reasonable 
suspicion for Mr. Francke’s traffic stop, is unconstitutionally vague as applied, there was 
no reasonable and articulable suspicion that the truck he occupied was being driven 
contrary to traffic laws.  See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.  The 
traffic stop therefore violated Mr. Francke’s constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417.  The district court 
erred when it denied Mr. Francke’s motion to suppress.  The district court should have 
suppressed the drug and drug paraphernalia evidence found as a result of the 
traffic stop.  See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88; Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. 
                                            
1 But see, e.g., English v. State, 191 So.3d 448, 451 (Fla. 2016) (holding “a tag light, 
hanging down in front of a license plate, obscuring its alphanumeric designation, 
constitutes a violation of [Florida’s statute on the display of license plates].”); Parks v. 
State, 247 P.3d 857, 861 (Wyo. 2011) (“We agree with the majority of jurisdictions that 
have considered the issue and determined that a trailer ball positioned so as to partially 
obstruct a license plate constitutes a violation of the respective license plate 
display statute.”) 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, Mr. Francke respectfully requests this Court vacate his 
judgment of conviction, reverse the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, 
and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 24th day of October, 2016. 
 
      ____/S/_____________________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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